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DIL EMMAS IN THE INJUNCTION
SOME DILEMMAS IN THE INJUNCTION AGAINST
RECOGNITIONAL PICKETING
JA S P. WHYTE*
Introduction
The history of the labor injunction in United States courts
presents problems of social conflict within American industry
which have not been solved satisfactorily by either courts or
legislatures. Basically these problems concern whether a labor
organization should be enjoined from engaging in concerted
activities because of the harm caused to management or whether
the benefit accruing to labor from the concerted activity is more
important than the harm done. Strikes and picketing for recog-
nition serve well to focus attention on this problem of value-
weighting, for recognition of the union by management is basic
to the achievement of union goals as is non-recognition sometimes
basic to the aims of management. It is the purpose of this article
to identify and partially explain the application of one or another
of these values, as recognized in the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, mostly by the District courts of the United
States when requested to issue an injunction against union con-
duct. In so doing no differentiation will be made in any phase of
the discussion between organizational and recognitional picketing.
I.
The Anti-Injunction Period
Prior to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 1 in 1932,
the granting of an injunction against picketing by a labor union
came almost as a matter of course. Such concerted activity for
the purpose of securing better wages was condemned as an inter-
ference with an employer's right to hire workers of his choice
when the picketing had the effect of preventing the employer
*Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary.
129 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.
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from getting workmen Similarly when a union set up a picket
in an effort to induce employees to join it, the picketing was
considered to be an unlawful interference with a sort of property
right - that of disposing of one's labor with full freedom.3 Indeed
it was found violative of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States for
a state to deny the use of the injunction in a special class of cases
arising from labor disputes. 4 Notwithstanding such conventional
judicial attitudes, it was simultaneously realized that other in-
terests than those belonging to the employer were at stake. Ad-
mitting that interference with the vested rights of the employer
was caused by picketing his premises, the thought was introduced
that such interference might be justified and hence not action-
able.5 The justification, it was said, is found when the aspects of
free competition are worth more to society than its costs. 6 Hence
the picket line was characterized as necessary to strengthen an
association of working men and to give unity to their organization
which was necessary for the success of the union in a society of
free competition.7 But these enlightened viewpoints failed to
find wide judicial acceptance, and it was not until Congress, after
at least one unsuccessful attempt,8 enacted a law depriving
2Vegelhan v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
3Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
4Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
5Holmes dissenting in Vegelhan v. Gunter, supra note 2.
6lbid.
7Holmes dissenting in Plant v. Woods, supra note 3.
8The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq., passed in 1914, § 20: "... no
restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer
and employees, or between employers and employees, or between em-
ployees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment,
involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury ro erty, or
to a property right, of the party making the application, for whi injury
there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right
must be described with particularity in the application, which must be in
writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney..."
Such provision was initially considered by unions as a bar to an injunction
against concerted activities. But Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 245
U.S. 443 (1921), in placing emphasis on the use of the term "lawful,"
invoked prevailing common law concepts and rendered the Clayton Act
completely ineffectual as an anti-injunction law.
DLE.MMAS m Tm INjuNCTION
United States' courts of jurisdiction to issue an injunction against
concerted activities involving a labor dispute,9 that labor's interest
in economic competition was recognized as national policy.
Initial judicial reaction to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in cases
involving picketing, the purpose of which was to organize the
employees of an employer or secure recognition from the employer
as the -bargaining agent of his employees, was to treat the matter
as not being a labor dispute. The rationale in such cases was to
regard the anti-injunction law as one designed to protect em-
ployees in a dispute involving wages, hours, or other conditions of
employment, and not as extending to negotiations merely leading
to collective bargaining where such matters would ultimately be
encountered. 10 However, it was soon realized that § 13 of Norris-
LaGuardia was sufficiently broad to cover organizational and
recognitional picketing." And it was stated that because the
policy of Norris-LaGuardia was to provide employees full freedom
of association, self-organization and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, free from interference or restraint of their
employer, did not mean that an injunction would be issued
where there was otherwise a labor dispute.12 Subsequent judicial
developments gave the anti-injunction spirit of Norris-La Guardia
such broad scope that injunctions were refused even where an
employer by refusing to accede to the demands of a union picket-
ing to secure organization or recognition might well violate §§ 7,
8(5) and 9(a) of the Wagner Act,13 by forcing his employees to
join a union in violation of their right to freedom of choice, by
forcing him to bargain with a union other than the labor organi-
zation representing the majority of his employees, and by failing
to give due effect to the union selected by the majority of his
employees as the exclusive representative of his employees.'4 The
9 Supra note 1
10See, e.g., Oberman and Co., Inc. v. United Garment Workers of America,
et al., 21 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
1129 U.S.C.A. § 163.
12Lauf, et al. v. Skinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
1329 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 158(a) (5), 159(a).
14Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72, et al. v. Fur Workers Union No. 21238,
et al., 105 F. 2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, per curiam, 308 U.S. 522
(1939).
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explanation for leaving an employer in such an intolerable dilem-
ma was that the Federal courts had no power to determine which
of competing union was the lawful and appropriate bargaining
agent for a given unit of employees, jurisdiction of such matters
having been vested exclusively in the National Labor Relations
Board.'
The passage of the Wagner Act in 193516 did nothing to
change the effect of Norris-LaGuardia. On the contrary, it
introduced a new theory into union organizing. While ostensibly
the bringing of free elections to the plant levels so that workers
would have the freedom to choose or reject a trade union ad-
vanced political democracy, there was nothing in the Wagner
Act requiring the union to utilize election procedures or abandon
self-help practices. It was possible for a union to picket for an
election, and continue the picket when it lost. Further, a union
could be successful in an election only to find that a rival by
picketing was forcing the employer and his employees to abandon
their free choice in favor of an unwanted rival." In short, in
the area of economic competition recognized by the Wagner Act
it made little difference whether unorganized workers joined a
union because they wished it, because forced to join by the
employer, or because power in the union to shut down their jobs
left no alternative. 18 If anything, the Wagner Act aided and
abetted organizational and recognitional picketing. 9
15Ibid.
1629 U.S.C.A. §§ 141, et seq.
17See, Fleming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 N.W. U. L. REV.
666, 696 (1960).
18 See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 263 (1959).
19The notable picketing cases from 1935 to 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act
amendments to Wagner were passed, concerned primaril whether or not
it was within the power of a state legislature to oscribe picketing as a
matter of policy. Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937), held
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit Wisconsin from author-
izing peaceful stranger picketing by a union attempting to organize a sho
and-prevent the employer from working in the shop as a laborer. Thornhil
v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 88 (1940), held picketing in general subject to the
protection of the free speech concepts of the Fourteenth Amendment as
against a statute subjecting picketing and loitering to criminal penalties.Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941),upheld a stae injunction invoked ainst violent picketing, while A.F.L.
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) held an injunction against peaceful
DEMMAS iN T INJumCION
II.
The Redevelopment of the Labor Injunction:
Taft-Hartley Act
The Taft-Hartley Amendments ° to the Wagner Act did not
revive the use of the labor injunction in its traditional sense. It
picketing unconstitutional even though there was no immediate labor dis-
pute between the emplo er and his empyloees. Then it was recognized
that more than communication was involved in picketing, and state injunc-
tions against secondary picketing were upheld in Carpenters' Union v.
Bitter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), though picketing was generally not
subject to injunction when its purpose was dissemination of truthful ifor-
mation. Bakery Drivers v. WohM, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
20U.S.CA. § 160 (1): "Whenever it is charged that any person has en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)
(A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b), or section 8(e) or section 8(b)(7) thepreliminary investigation of suc charge shall be made forthwith and given
priority over al other cases except cases of like character in the offce where
it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer
or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable
cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he
shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any district court of the United
States (including the District Court of the United States for the District
of Columbia) within any district where the unfairar in practice in ques-
tion has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person
resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the
final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the
filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just andproper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further,
ofat no temporary restraining ordereshall be issued without notice unless
a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the char gn
party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be
effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the expiration
of such period: Provided further, That such ohaer or regional attorney
shall not apply for any restraining order under section 8e)(7) if a charge
against the employer under section h(a(2 has been filed and after
the preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such
charge is true and that a complaint should issue. Upon filing of any such
petition the courts shall causie daysthereof to be served upon any person
involved in the charge and suc person, including the chargfing party, shall
be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevanttestimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection dis-
trict courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization
(1) in the district in which such organization maintains its prinidpal
office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents
are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members.
The service of legal process upuon urech officer or agent shall constitute
service upon thie labor organzation and make such organization a party to
the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedur e eid-
fied herein shall apply to charges with respect to sections 8(b)(4) D)."
Landrum-Griffin amendments are indicated by italics.
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has frequently been held that the provisions of Taft-Hartley
permitting an injunction do not in any way abrogate the anti-
injunction features of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The courts of
the United States still do not have jurisdiction to entertain a
private suit in which an injunction is sought where a labor dispute
is involved.21 The National Labor Relations Board, however, was
authorized to seek an injunction in an appropriate Federal
District Court whenever it was charged that any person has
engaged in an unfair labor practice, the object of which was to
induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in
a concerted refusal to use, manufacture, process, transport or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities to to perform any services where an object of such
conduct was to force an employer to join a labor organization;
to force any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, and the like, the products of any other
producer, to cease doing business with any other person, or forc-
ing any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representatives of his employees unless such
labor organization has been so certified as the representative of
such employees; or to force any employer to recognize or bargain
with a particular organization as the representative of his em-
ployees if another labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees.22
21See W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 217 F. 2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954);
Associated Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of America, 114 F. Supp.
334 (S.D. Cal. 1953); United Packinghouse Workers of America v.
Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Il. 1948).
2229 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(A)(B)(C)(D): It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for a labor organization or its agents- ... (4)(i) to engage in, or to
induce or encourage [the employees of any employer] any individual em-
ployed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
comnmerce to engage in, a strike or a [concerted] refusal in the course of
[their] his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in
either case an object thereof is -
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is
prohibited by section 8 (e);(B) forcing or requiring [any employer or other] person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize
DLEMMAS IN THE INJUNCTION
In permitting the Board to seek an injunction against recogni-
tional picketing, emphasis is placed on picketing by non-certified
unions. This emphasis has been respected by the Federal District
courts as an essential consideration in granting injunctions even
in instances where certification was in name only. Where a union
was certified but within two years had lost its majority and was
not actively functioning, a rival union was prohibited from con-
certed activities calculated to force the employer to recognize it.P
The decisive factor was held to be certification, not majority
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9: Provided, That nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawfu1, any primary strike or primary picketing;
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with
a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if
another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 9;
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particilar labor organization or in a particular trade, craft,
or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in
another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform
to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining repre-
sentative for employees performing such work:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be con-
strued to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises
of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such
employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative
of suc employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this
Act: Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only,
nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit pub-
licity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a
product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor
organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer,
as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course
of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods,
or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer en-
gaged in such distribution." Landrum-Griffin amendments are indicated
by italics. Portions now omitted are in brackets.
23Parks v. Atlanta Pressmen and Assistants Union No. 8, et al., 243 F. 2d
284 (5th Cir. 1957), Cert. den. 354 U.S. 937 (1957). It should be noted
that this case does not involve an injunction but, rather, a damage suit and
an unfair labor practice charge without the exercise of § 10 (1) (note 20,
supra). It has been criticized as extending the rule requiring certification
beyond its justification on the premise that once an employer is relieved
of the legal duty to barg with a certified union, the only question is
what techniques should be open to a union which may lawflly seek to
become the majority choice of the employees in an appropriate unit. See
Cox, supra note 18, at 264.
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status or lack of it. Until, by Board action, certification is ex-
tinguished, "it has continued vitality to protect an employee
against a raiding rival whose objective is 'forcing or requiring
[such] employer to recognize or bargain with... [it] ... as the
representative of his employees.' "24 And where an uncertified
rival union induces the employees of the employer, who has
recognized another certified union, to picket and refuse to handle
goods, it is clear that an injunction may issue.25
Even in instances where a picketing union has a plausible
claim to being party to a collective agreement, certification of a
rival union is controlling. Thus where union A represented X's
employees on certain ships, union B representing employees on
Y's vessels, which were purchased by X, and B was certified
following election as the representative of X's employees on the
purchased ship, picketing by A was not successfully defended by
its contract claim, the court holding its position ignored the
necessity of certification.26 Incidentally, the certification of an
individual, in contrast to a labor organization, satisfies the certifi-
cation requirement, for a labor organization is defined as any
agency.2 7
In situations where picketing by an uncertified union em-
bodied features in addition to recognitional purposes, the picket-
241d., at 290.
25NLRB v. Wholesale & Warehouse Workers' Union, Local 65, 17 CCH
Labor Cases 1 65,468 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (hereafter cited L.C.).
26NLRB v. National Maritime Union of America, 157 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
2729 U.S.C.A. § 152(5). NLRB v. Bonnaz, Hand Embroiderers, Tuckers,
Stitchers, Pleaters Union, 124 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See, also,
NLRB v. District Council of Ports of Puerto Rico, Int'l Longshoremen's
Association, 107 F. Supp. 235 (D. Puerto Rico 1952) where one union
made an illegal raid on the governing body of the certified union in order
to avoid the certification requirement. It should, of course, be noted here
that respect of certification is a requirement applying to employers as well
as labor organizations. Thus where union A petitioned for a certification
election and pending the outcome the employer recognized and executed
a collective agreement with B with which it had contracted for several
years, and thereafter A was certified. It was held that an injunction would
issue against the employer. NLRB v. Cargill, Inc., 22 L.C. I 67,074 (N.D.
III. 1952). Even where there is a considerable lapse of time between a
petition for an election and certification, an employer is not excased from
contracting with the rival union. NLRB v. Paiic Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 218 F. 2d 542 (9th Cir. 1955).
DmEMMAS IN TE INJUNCTION
ing union frequently claimed to escape the prohibition applying
to recognitional picketing by claiming the real purpose of the
picketing was for non-prohibited reasons which often reflected
respected, traditional union goals. Generally such defenses to an
injunction were to no avail, the courts stressing the prohibited
recognitional feature. Such rulings were applied where, in
addition to seeking recognition, a union picketed to demand rein-
statement of workers allegedly unfairly discharged, and restoration
of seniority and wages to striking employees;28 where it was
claimed the employer violated an arbitrator's award under a gen-
eral agreement;29 where new outlets of the employer's store
business were opened after another union's certification;-3 where
the non-certified union claimed a certain type of work properly
belonged to it rather than the certified union;31 where an attempt
was being made to protect a traditional area of coverage;32 where
an attempt was to organize a few employees allegedly not covered
by the certification;3 and, where the certified union allegedly
failed to process grievances thoroughly.3
Now and again an attempt was made to escape the prohibition
against recognitional picketing by distinguishing the picketing as
organizational in nature. In one instance Union B, after pic-
keting X for over four months, demanded X sign a collective
agreement. X refused, however, as at the time it had no em-
ployees. Meanwhile an election had been conducted and union
A was certified as the representative of X's employees. After such
certification, B continued its picketing with signs reading: "This
28NLRB v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, General Local 200, 25 L.C.
f 68,273 (E.D. Wis. 1954).
29NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremen's Association, Independent & Local, 1814, 177
F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
S0NLRB v. Clerk's Int'l Association, Local 1460, 26 L.C. 11 68,674 (N.D.
Ind. 1954).
31NLRB v. Local 2247, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, 34 L.C. 71,289 (3rd Div. Alaska 1958).
32NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Association, 161 F. Supp. 161 (N.D.
Ohio 1958).
33NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, 85 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
34NLRB v. District 50, United Mine Workers of America, 21 L.C. f 66,966
(E.D. Tenn. 1952).
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is organizational picketing. We appeal to all workers applying
for employment in the shop of [X], and to any workers already
hired, to join our union and enjoy its benefits..." As in cases
where there were features other than recognitional, it was held
that while the signs merely were an appeal to join B, it was infer-
able that the true object of the picketing was to exert pressures
on X, its employees, and the employees of other employers to com-
pel X to recognize B and bargain with it. 3
Implicit in many of the foregoing situations is the requirement
that for an injunction to issue there must be conduct tantamount
to a refusal to perform normal services with an object of requiring
any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular union if
another union is certified.3 In essence such concerted activity
must include significant elements of coercion. Otherwise the
limitations expressed in § 13 of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, stating that nothing, except as specifically provided
for, shall be construed either to interfere with, impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or quali-
fications on that right, are controlling.37 The Supreme Court of
the United States has held in the case of a non-certified union
which picketed an employer to secure recognition and "encour-
aged" the employees of a neutral employer to refuse to deliver
goods, which "encouragement" consisted of only an isolated inci-
dent of such employees refusing to cross a picket line, that such
coercion did not result in the type of concerted activity proscribed
by § 8(b)(4). To apply the Act in such instances would be to
diminish the traditional right to strike, for there was no concerted
conduct by the employees of the neutral employer nor any attempt
to induce such action.38 Hence concerted activities for recognition
are not per se illegal. Definite coercive pressures must also be
exerted.39
35NLRB v. Knit Goods Workers' Union Local 155, International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers' Union, 27 L.C. 1 68,802 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
36Cox, supra note 18, at 263-4; see cases cited in notes 28-35, supra.
3729 U.S.C.A. § 163.
38NLRB v. International Rice Milling Company, Inc., et al., 341 U.S. 665
(1951).
29NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, 121 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
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The emphasis placed on § 13 of the Act continues to have
significant meaning when the National Labor Relations Board
construes recognitional picketing as violative of other sections
of the Act. This is clearly seen in the history of the so-called
Curtis doctrine. While this doctrine deals with an unfair labor
practice rather than an injunction per se, its relationship to the
issuance of injunctions is clear. In this case, union A was certified
in 1953 as the exclusive representative of certain of Curtis' em-
ployees. However, a strike the next year depleted A's member-
ship and, when, after another year Curtis petitioned for another
election, A wrote the Board that it did not claim to represent a
majority of the employees. Thereafter the employees voted "no
union." Nonetheless, A thereafter established a peaceful picket
at Curtis' retail store. The signs carried by the pickets simply
stated, in substance, that Curtis did not employ union workers
and that A wished Curtis' employees to join it to gain union
wages, hours and working conditions. Ultimately Curtis made
such conduct the subject of an unfair labor practice charging that
A had restrained or coerced its employees in the exercise of their
right not to join a labor union,40 because the picketing was recog-
nitional designed to force Curtis to recognize A as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees even though A did not
represent a majority of the employees. The Board, seeing such
conduct as economic pressure on Curtis which hurt employees
continuing to work, held that the Act applied to indirect, as well
as direct, coercion of employees, and issued a cease and desist
order.41 The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the Board's
order, holding § 8(b)(1)(A) inapplicable to peaceful picketing
whether organizational or recognitional in nature.42
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals was
affirmed. 43 Realizing that tension existed between the right of
4029 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 158C()(1)(A).
41Matter of Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local 639 and Curtis Bros., Inc.,
119 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1957).
42Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local 639, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, 274 F. 2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
accord, NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local No. 182, 272 F. 2d 85 (2nd Cir.
1959); contra, NLRB v. United Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers,
269 F. 2d 694 (4th Cir. 1959), reversed, 1er curiam, 362 U.S. 329
(1960).
43NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, etc., Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
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employees to refrain from joining a labor organization and their
right to do so,44 it was nevertheless held that, in this case, the
Board's order would impede the right to strike, unless § 8(b)
(1)(A) provided otherwise. 45 Hence § 13 of the Act is treated
as "a command of Congress to the courts to resolve doubts and
ambiguities in favor of an interpretation of 8(b)(1)(A) which
safeguards the right to strike as understood prior to the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act." It was concluded that Taft-Hartley
authorized the Board to regulate peaceful 'recognitional'
picketing only when it is employed to accomplish objectives
specified in 8(b)(4); and that 8(b)(1)(A) is a grant of
power to the Board limited to authority to proceed against
union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or
threats thereof - conduct involving more than general pres-
sures upon persons employed by the affected employers im-
plicit in economic strikes.4 '
The Taft-Hartley Amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, then, remedied some of the injustices prevailing under
the combined approach of the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner
Acts. Still there are features that have been considered short-
comings. It has been pointed out that a union might be legally
recognized by an employer without an election or certification
so that § 8(b)(4)(C) would not apply. Also, if a union insisted
successfully it was interested only in organization, not recognition,
an employer would have no basis to ask for an election since
there was no claim for recognition. 48 It has further been demon-
strated that § 8 (b)(4)(C) was, in part, incomplete. For a con-
tract with a majority union bars an election for a reasonable
period, and minority picketing for recognitional or organizational
purposes during such period, like picketing during the first year
of certification, seeks to override the will of the majority and to
compel an employer to violate his legal obligations.49
4429 U.S.C.A. § 157.
45NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, etc., Local 639, supra note 43, at 282.
461d., at 282.
471d., at 290.
48Fleming, supra note 17, at 697.
49Cox, supra note 18, at 264.
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III.
Further Redevelopments of the Labor Injunction:
Effect of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments
To cure the foregoing alleged shortcomings of the Taft-Hart-
ley Amendments and also to prevent what harshly, yet vaguely,
came to be known as "blackmail" picketing and "sweetheart"
agreements, the Landrum-Griffin Act, effective November 13,
1959, added an entirely new section, 8(b)(7)(C),50 to the
National Labor Relations Act. Passage of such amendments has
provoked a great deal of well informed comment and predictions
of what effect these amendments will have.5
5029 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(7)(C). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents... (7) to picket or cause to be picketed,
or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object
thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a
labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or
requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor
organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor
orgamzation is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this
Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation
may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act. (B)
where within tle preceding twelve months a valid election under section
9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or (C) where such picketing has
been conducted without a petition under section 9(c) being filed within
a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commence-
ment of such picketing: Provided, That when such a petition has been
filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section
9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part
of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board
finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided fur-
ther, That nothing in this ubparaga h (C) shall be construed to prohibit
ant picketing or other publicity for e purpose of truthfully advising the
public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members
of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such
picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the
course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods
or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act
which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b).
5lEg., Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 1086 (1960); Come, Picketing under the 1959
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, N.Y.U. THIR-
TEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 105 (1960); Cox,
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959); Fairweather, An Evolution of the
Changes in Taft-Hartley, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 711 (1960); Fleming,
Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 666
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It is first to be noted that the Landrum-Griffin Amendments
treat recognitional and organizational picketing as the same. It
would be inaccurate to say that such picketing is prohibited
(though to date such is the effect), rather it is made subject to
other complex and ambiguous restrictions. Briefly, Landrum-
Griffin makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
to picket any employer if an object thereof is to force recognition,
bargaining or organization where: (A) the employer has lawfully
recognized another union and a question concerning representa-
tion may not be raised under section 9(c); (B) where, within 12
months an election has been held under 9(c); or (C) when such
picketing has been conducted without a 9(c) petition having
been filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 30
days from the commencement of the picketing. Two provisos of
(C) declare, first, that when such petition has been filed the
Board shall forthwith certify the results thereof without regard
to 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of substantial interest on
the part of the union; and, second, that informational picketing
remains inviolate unless an effect of the picketing is to induce
any individual employed by any other person in the course of his
employment not to render normal services. 52
While probably sufficient time has not yet passed for litigation
to show the myriad of problems raised by § 8(b)(7) in practical
application, there are indications the most significant troubles
will come from subsections (A) and (C) and (C)'s second pro-
viso both internally and from tensions with other portions of the
National Labor Relations Act. Subsection (A) goes beyond the
protection afforded in § 8(b)(4)(C) 53 in protecting one union
from attack by another. Formerly a union was entitled to an
election even though the employer was willing to grant recogni-
tion without one.5 Consequently certification is made to carry
a high degree of assurance that an incumbent union is the free
(1960); McDermott, Recognitional and Organizational Picketing under
Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 LAB. L. J. 727 (1960); Ro-
nayne, Picketing under Landrum-Griffin, N.Y.U. THIRTEENTH AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 227 (1960); Van Arkel, Picketing
under the 1959 Amendments, Ibid. 201; and Young, Picketing under the
1959 Amendments, Ibid. 213.
52Supra note 50. Italics added.
5 3Supra note 22.
54Cf., Fleming, supra note 51, at 697-8.
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majority choice which is not achieved by the mere signing of a
contract.55 Literally § 8(b)(7)(A) prohibits recognitional pic-
keting if an employer has a contract with a union representing
only a unit of workers. It might also outlaw organizational pic-
keting if a question of representation could not appropriately be
raised under 9(c) simply because of the union's inability to prove
it had been designated by 30% of the employees in the bargaining
unit.56 It is further noted that since § 8(b)(7) applies only to
picketing, a question arises as to whether a union could strike,
incite a secondary boycott or pass out handbills in support of a
demand for recognition even though an employer has recognized
another certified union. If so the conduct would violate § 8(b)
(4)(C)'7 Specifically § 8(b)(7)(C) would bar such conduct
though the principle of according lawful recognition the same
status as certification would require an opposite answer.58 There
are, as yet, no judicial answers to these explicit questions.
The proscription in § 8(b)(7)(B) from picketing within
twelve months of a valid election is said to do more than simply
protect the rights of employees to refrain from engaging in col-
lective bargaining, for the prohibition applies equally to any
union wishing to organize employees. Emphasis here is placed on
promoting industrial stability rather than the unrestricted free-
dom of employees to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, for even though one union may be rejected
by a unit of employees, another union presumably finding favor
with them cannot either picket for recognition or secure an elec-
tion for twelve months.5 9 Thus far District Courts have inter-
preted § 8(b)(7)(B) literally when finding reasonable cause to
issue injunctions. Neither pleas of freedom of speech, ° nor that
the picketing was for lawful reasons in addition to recognition61
55Cf., Cox, supra note 51, at 264-5.
56Cf., Aaron, supra note 51, at 1103; Cox, supra note 51, at 265.
57Supra note 22.
58Aaron, supra note 51, at 1102; Cf., McDermott, supra note 51, at 728-9.
59Cf., Aaron, supra note 51, at 1103-4; McDermott, supra note 51, at 732.
6ONLRB v. Local 344, Retail Clerks International Ass'n, 38 L.C. 65,987
(S.D. IM. 1959).
61NLRB v. Auto Mechanics Lodge 701, Int'l Ass'n of machinists, 39 L.C.
66,188 (N.D. Il. 1960).
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have been acceptable defenses.6 Thus the courts have so far
dodged the issue of whether freedom to organize has been unduly
restricted.
It is § 8(b)(7)(C), however, which has to date produced the
most litigation, reflecting problems of a serious and complex
nature. The banning of recognitional picketing for "reasonable"
time not to exceed 30 days is seen by one commentator as so
vague and uncertain that it raises Constitutional issues.6 Not-
withstanding, the Courts have treated the matter as dependent
on the facts involved in the picketing. Where rendition of normal
services to the employer was not affected in that deliveries con-
tinued as usual, 27 days was held to be a reasonable time.6 But
when threats and violence accompanied the picketing, a ten-day
delay in filing a petition for an election was unreasonable, 65 as
was a delay of 15 days when the picketing stopped deliveries and
the rendition of services to the picketed employer.6
The reference to § 9(c) of the act in the first proviso to sub-
section (C) is likewise apt to produce litigation because of
ambiguity. It is stated in § 9(c)(1) that either party may file for
an election. However, if under § 8(b)(7)(C) an election is
directed without regard to § 9(c)(1), and § 9(c)(1) nonetheless
calls for an election and hearing, it is difficult to see how the
Board may proceed without regard to § 9(c)(1).67
Even more complex are the problems created by the second
proviso of § 8(b)(7)(C). Here, in accordance with general
principles of free speech, informational picketing is recognized as
legitimate union activity. Yet it must not have the effect of in-
ducing any person employed by any other person not to render
normal services to the picketed employer. Supposing the pick-
62NLRB v. Dist. 76, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, 39 L.C.
V 66,419 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
6 3Aaron, supra note 51, at 1109-10.
64NLRB v. Local 239, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers, 179 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
65NLRB v. United Shoe Workers of America, 181 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1960).
66NLRB v. Sapulpa Typographical Union No. 619, Int'l Typographical Union,
38 L.C. 66,020 (N.D. Okla. 1959).
6 7Aaron, supra note 51, at 1107.
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eting is truly informational, will the fact that deliverymen refuse
to cross the picket line bring the case within NLRB v. Interna-
tional Rice Milling Company,8 so as to make this section of the
Act continually uncertain in its operation? Or will the courts look
narrowly to the fact that normal services are being interrupted?
As far as finding reasonable cause for the issuance of an injunc-
tion is concerned, present holdings indicate the impeding of
services is conclusive.69 Yet in such cases elements of "'coercion"'
and "inducement' are hard to find.
Informational picketing can take many forms. Mostly it
seeks to advise the public that the picketed employer does not
have a union contract, or that union wages and working condi-
tions are not being met. It cannot be denied that a long-standing
union objective is to raise wages and improve working conditions.
In the equality of economic competition envisioned by Holmes"
and attempted in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
it is essential that union-organized business not be forced to com-
pete at a disadvantage with non-union competitors. It is clear,
then, that informational picketing does not necessarily contem-
plate recognition or organization. Yet it is impossible to ignore
the fact that such objectives are not accomplished by merely talk-
ing about them. Wages are not usually raised nor working con-
ditions ordinarily improved until the union secures recognition
from the "offending" employer and organizes his employees. For
these reasons there is a dilemma encountered whenever a ques-
tion of informational picketing is raised.
Perhaps unfortunately the matter is treated in too superficial
a fashion by the Board. As has been suggested, the basic premise
is that any picketing by a union not recognized or certified is
unlawful. This result is reached summarily by the General
Counsel asking the union whether picketing will stop if recogni-
tion is given. The answer, naturally, is in the affirmative, and this
is considered to show that an object of the picketing is recogni-
68341 U.S. 665 (1951).
69See NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen & Helpers, supra note 64, and NLRB v. Sapulpa Typographical
Union No. 619, Int'l Typographical Union, supra note 66.
7ODissenting in Vegelhan v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) and
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
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tion. 71 Yet in the courts inquiring whether reasonable cause exists
for the issuance of an injunction, two opposing views are emerg-
ing. On one hand, it has been held that the second proviso of
§ 8(b)(7)(C) has no application and does not apply where an
object of the picketing is to force recognition from an employer
or to force organization of his employees, even though another
purpose of the picketing is to truthfully advise the public that
the employer does not employ union members or have a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with a union. This, it is said, is so
whether or not the effect of the picketing is to impede the flow
of normal services and incidents of daily business.72
Conversely, where there is no impeding of normal services, em-
phasis is put on the absence of inducement to obstruct the flow of
normal services. In regard to the employer's contention that the
exception for informational picketing had no application where
the picketing was for recognition, one court said that it was
difficult to imagine any kind of informational picketing where
another object would not be ultimate recognition, for in most
cases the aim of the picketing could only be to bring economic
pressure on the employer to recognize and bargain with the
union. To adopt the employer's viewpoint would be to render
the statutory consent to informational picketing meaningless. 73 In
considering the unfair labor practice aspects of recognitional as
opposed to informational picketing, the National Labor Relations
Board has interpreted the Act literally and narrowly, although
placing a great deal of emphasis on the picketing impeding normal
services. 74 It follows from this viewpoint that any recognitional
picketing is not excused because of the presence of another,
71Van Arkel, supra note 51, at 202.
72NLRB v. Retail Hose Employees Union Local 400, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n,
39 L.C. 66,201 (D.C. 1960); NLRB v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, 38 L.C. 1 66,051 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
73NLRB v. Bartenders & Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 58, 181
F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
74Local 89, Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Assistants, Hotel and Restaurant
Employees Union and Stork Restaurant, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1961);
Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel Restaurant Employees and Bar-
tenders Int'l Union of Long Beachland and Irwin, 130 N.L.R.B. No. 68
(1961); Local 840, Int'l Hod Carriers' Bldg. & Common Laborers' Union
and Blinne Construction Co., 130 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1961).
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legitimate object such as discrimination against union employees
or other unfair labor practices.75
While the provisions of § 8(b)(7)(C) create problems when
compared to several other sections of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended,76 it is when compared with the prohibitions of
employer unfair labor practices77 that some of the most perplexing
dilemmas arise. Suppose union A, uncertified, has demanded
recognition and bargaining from employer X, claiming to repre-
sent 100% of X's employees in an appropriate unit. X declines to
recognize A, and A commences picketing, not bothering to file for
an election. Meanwhile X discharges the employees A claims to
represent. A files an unfair labor practice charge as a result of
which the discharged employees are ordered back to work by the
National Labor Relations Board. However, the employees refuse
to return to work until X recognizes A. A claims, when X seeks
an injunction against the picketing, it having continued through-
out, that no accelerated election under § 8(b)(7)(C) is needed
when it represented a majority of employees in defending an
unfair labor practice charge, and that the question of majority
representation can be heard when the National Labor Relations
Board hears the § 8(b)(7) charge. On this set of facts it has
been held: (1) Delay in filing for an election within 30 days
after the commencement of recognitional picketing is more than
a technical violation; (2) the Act does not apply solely to minority
unions; and, (3) it would destroy the purpose of the Act to
forego application of bars against recognitional picketing every
time an unfair labor practice charge is lodged.73 This holding ap-
pears to be technically correct, for § 8(b)(7) would not ordinarily
75See cases cited supra note 72. NLRB accord: Local 705, Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers and Cartage and Termi-
nal Management Corporation, 130 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1961). It should be
noted, however, that when a charge has been filed alleging domination or
interference with the formation or administration of any labor organization
or financial support thereof, and there is reasonable cause to believe the
charge is true, regional attorneys are not to apply for a restraining order.
See supra note 20.
76See: Aaron, supra note 51 at 1104-5; Fairweather, supra note 51, at 733;
Fleming, supra note 51, at 700; and McDermott, supra note 51, at 730,
731.
7729 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5).
78NLRB v. International Typographical Union, Local 285, 39 L.C. 1 66,109
(D.C. 1960).
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apply to picketing against unfair labor practices, such not usually
being designed for recognition or organization. Yet here the
picketing necessarily sought recognition as a remedy for an unfair
labor practice. Literally, then, the picketing fell within the pro-
hibitions of § 8(b)(7) since an object was recognition.79
But should the basic right to picket against unfair labor
practices be abridged by § 8(b)(7) when no intent to do so ap-
pears in the statute? And should the union be required to choose
between unfair labor practice procedures and the picket line
when any unlawful refusal to bargain puts it in a less favorable
position than if the employer had not committed an unfair labor
practice? The Board has held that a representation proceeding is
inconsistent with a refusal to bargain proceeding. 0 Yet the union
may, having to petition for an election, lose it because of the
employer's unfair labor practice.81
Finally, a brief discussion of what effect the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments are apt to have on the Curtis8 case is justified. The
The case itself found § 8(b)(7)(C) to be a "relevant considera-
tion."83 And a memorandum "dissent" suggested return of
the case to the National Labor Relations Board for reconsidera-
tion on the basis of the new legislation. 4 It may be that §
8(b)(7) was intended to change the Court's decision, thus per-
mitting injunctions against picketing potentially coercive of
employee rights to select representatives of their own choosing.83
Or it may be that the Curtis doctrine will continue except where
limited by § 8(b)(7).6 But more likely the major question will
be the effect of § 8(b)(7)(C) on labor's Constitutional right to
picket as an expression of free speech.87 Short of a decision
79Come, supra note 51, at 193.
8OAiello, et al. and C.I.O., 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954).




85Cf., Ronayne, supra note 51, at 234.
86Fairweather, supra note 51, at 714.
87Young, supra note 51, at 216.
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holding § 8(b)(7) unconstitutional, it seems likely that § 1318 of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, will be applied to
resolve the section's inherent ambiguities in favor of the right to
strike and picket for traditional labor objectives upon the same
basis as the conflict between §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(1)(A) was
resolved.
Conclusion
In summary, it may be stated that the problems inherent in
enjoining recognitional picketing still seek adequate and com-
plete answers. Here, possibly more so than in any other aspect of
the labor-management struggle, basic concepts are at war. Indus-
try needs a high degree of stability in order to fulfill its promise
of efficient production. Labor must be recognized in order to
fulfill its promise of bettering the lot of the employee. It is
unfortunate that Holmes' concept of economic competition has
found expression in legislation which from time to time seeks
merely to balance one value against another, resulting in a hodge-
podge of vague, uncertain and confusing legislation with which
the courts can do little more than pinpoint dilemmas or avoid
them by narrow reliance on the specific statutory wording. The
assumption that what is good for industry alone is good for the
country is no more true than the assumption that what is good
for labor alone is good for the country. If the idea that labor-
management competition ought to be on an equal basis can be
ascribed to Holmes, it should be remembered that he also en-
visioned such free competition as being worth more to society
than its costs. Yet the interest of the public finds little or no
expression in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
This omission, except as partially expressed for National Emer-
gency situations, may well be the leavening factor needed to
resolve what are now intolerable dilemmas.
8829 U.S.C.A. § 163.
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